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Getting our Minds around Noel Canning v. NLRB:  An Exchange 
 
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin 
 
Sandy Levinson: 
In Noel Canning v. NLRB, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals 
invalidated three recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board 
made (or, it is now perhaps more accurate to say, purported to have been 
made) by President Obama.  The 45-page opinion is in many ways 
reminiscent of Justice Black’s opinion in the Steel Seizure Case or Justice 
Southerland’s opinion in the equally canonical Blaisdell case.  That is, Judge 
Sentelle adopts a rigorously (some might say “relentlessly” or even 
“mindlessly”) textual/originalist approach that argues first that the words 
“the recess” in the Recess Appointment Clause—“The President shall have 
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the 
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 
Session”—refer exclusively to “inter-session” recesses and not to “intra-
session” recesses that occur within a given session of Congress.  (That is, we 
do say that the current Congress is in its “third or fourth session” because, as 
a matter of fact, it might have taken several recesses during what we 
denominate either as its “first” or “second” session.)  Moreover, and to many 
equally surprising, was the determination that the words “may happen 
during the Recess” refers exclusively to vacancies that first occur while the 
Senate is in an inter-session recess.  This invalidates, for example, what has 
become the widespread practice, in administrations of both parties, of 
presidents making “recess appointments” during inrra-session recesses with 
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regard to vacancies that might well have initially occurred while the Senate 
was in session. 
For what it is worth, President Clinton made 139 recess appointments 
during his years in office, 95 of them full-time positions, while his 
successor, George W. Bush, made 171 recess appointments (of which 105 
were to full-time positions).  And they were building on precedents 
established by their own predecessors.  The DC Circuit declared forthrightly 
that relatively recent practices were irrelevant and that the case was 
controlled by the clear text and what they claimed were the original 
understandings of the Clause.  Among their sources, incidentally, was 
George Washington, who, the majority argued, made recess appointments 
only when the vacancy had indeed arisen during an intersession recess.  
Though they did not cite Akhil Amar’s new book on The Unwritten 
Constitution, one might note that Amar relies extensively on early practice, 
especially that by George Washington. 
 The decision has been widely derided, but one wonders exactly why.  
As it happens, one of us (Levinson) is writing these remarks just before 
teaching Chisholm v. Georgia in a course he is teaching on federalism, and 
four of the five justices in that case make explicit appeals to the text of 
Section 2 of Article III—“The judicial power shall extend to all cases . . 
between a state and citizens of another state….”  As with all instances of 
textual argument, the crushing question is “what part of ’all cases between a 
state and citizens of another state’ do you not understand, just as Justice 
Sutherland in Blaisdell asked the same question about what it was so 
difficult to understand that “no state shall pass any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts” just meant that “no state shall pass any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts.”  And, although we invoke Justice 
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Black’s opinion in the Steel Seizure Case—largely because, like Noel 
Canning, it involved what the court determined was an episode of executive 
overreaching—one could cite a host of Black’s First Amendment opinions 
that ultimately take the form of “what part of ‘no law” do you not 
understand?” 
 Unless one rejects any and all textual argument out of hand as 
impossibly naïve and unsophisticated—but what about the Inauguration Day 
Clause and its stupidly assuring that a rejected incumbent will be able to 
maintain office for eleven weeks following defeat by the ostensibly 
sovereign “We the People”?—it is difficult simply to dismiss Noel Canning 
if all one does is to read the opinion and evaluate the arguments.   
Perhaps the point, though, is that one can’t understand Noel Canning 
by remaining within the text of the opinion any more than one can 
understand Black’s opinion in Steel Seizure, Sutherland’s opinion in 
Blaisdell, or the most hoary of all constitutional chestnuts, Marbury v. 
Madison, simply by reading the opinion and the arguments made therein.  
To take the easiest case, it is impossible to understand (or to evaluate) 
Marbury without putting it within the context of the election of 1800 and the 
“revolution” effectuated by the replacement of Federalists by Jeffersonians.  
Marshall did his best to discredit his hated fellow-Virginian, but he 
ultimately capitulated by manufacturing an argument that the Court had no 
jurisdiction to hear the case.  Blaisdell is a case about what was perceived as 
the greatest sustained emergency, save for the Civil War, in American 
history, and, therefore, about the powers of government during an 
emergency.  Youngstown Steel is not only about supplying American armed 
forces during the Korean War, but, just as importantly, about the patently 
political actions of a widely unpopular President—his approval rating at the 
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time of the decision was 22%--who had unilaterally gone to war without 
congressional authorization (a fact highlighted in the concurring opinions of 
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson).   
 So what is the context of Noel Canning?  It is, one can be confident, a 
political reality that certainly did not, and probably could not, in terms of 
sociology of knowledge, have occurred to any of the vaunted “Framers”:  
The development of a virulent polarized party system—appropriate, as 
Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein have argued, to a parliamentary 
system, but one that creates havoc within the separation of powers and 
therefore “divided government” system chosen in 1787—was something that 
none of them could have expected.1  Whatever explains the Recess 
Appointment Clause, it was surely not motivated by the desire to make  sure 
that the Chief Executive could triumph in any dispute with a highly-partisan 
Senate that had every incentive to do whatever it could to assure lack of 
success by the President (especially if a first-term President contemplating 
re-election) with regard to any major programs.  It was, we can be confident, 
a “good government” measure designed to alleviate a real problem, i.e., 
vacancies arising during the very long times during which Congress was in 
recess between its regular first and second sessions that really needed to be 
filled before they got back to New York (or, later, Washington) and could 
scrutinize the President’s choices. 
 If one ignores the subsequent development of American politics 
following 1787, then the Court’s opinion in Noel Canning makes perfectly 
good sense.  Indeed, I would expect the Court that properly found federal 
                                                 
1 It may be an exaggeration to say that the Founders could not have imagined a “virulent” party system, in 
part because to many of them all party systems would justify that adjective.  To a significant extent, 
though, the Constitution was designed with the hope—and perhaps even expectation?—that the national 
government, at least, would be in the hands of relatively virtuous elites committed to the common good 
rather than the malign interests of their own “faction,” a/k/a “political party.” 
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jurisdiction in Chisholm, on the basis of plain text, to have been equally 
critical had even George Washington decided that he wanted to appoint 
someone to fill a vacancy that had arisen while the Senate was still in 
session even during an inter-session recess.  The idea of an “intra-session” 
recess, one might note, probably made no more sense to the Founding 
Generation than did the possibility of jet planes.  And, of course, it is 
precisely the creation of modern transportation, plus the more recent creation 
of the “permanent campaign” that has made “intra-session” recesses part of 
our political reality. 
 So on what basis does one evaluate Noel Canning?  Is there any 
“principled” basis to reject what many no doubt views as its wooden 
analysis in favor of a more functionalist account that pays full heed to the 
modern reality of frustrated Presidents facing virulently oppositionist 
Senates?  And even if one adopts functionalism over text as the correct 
approach, is there any reason, beyond one’s own political support for the 
President in question, for preferring a pro-presidential answer over a pro-
Senate answer to the question as to the circumstances under which a 
President can make a Recess Apportionment.2  Perhaps this is just another 
way of asking whether one can separate a “legal” analysis of the Clause 
from a profoundly political determination that, at least, one prefers to 
privilege one branch over another, or, even more pointedly, that one simply 
wants to help out Barack Obama in circumstances where one might easily 
describe George W. Bush as overreaching (given the fact that the Senate 
claimed not to have been even in an “intra-session recess” inasmuch as it 
                                                 
2 Perhaps the correct term here is “pro-obstructive minority of senators,” given that recess appointments 
would be totally unnecessary if the Senate moved with alacrity to vote presidential nominees up or down.  
This in turn raises two questions:  Are filibusters always malign?  And are there implicit limits on the 
ability of the Senate (like the House) to make its own rules of procedure, which, of course, currently 
validate the filibuster? 
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adopted a ploy, first initiated by Democrats during the Bush Administration, 
of holding pro-forma convenings of the Senate where literally only a handful 
of Senators were present and where assurances had been given that no 




Noel Canning occurs within the confluence of two long-term political trends. 
The first is extreme party polarization, with the Republicans in particular 
having become hostage to the party's most radical elements. 
The second event, not unrelated to the first, is our country’s position 
in what Stephen Skowronek calls “political time.” I believe that we are 
either at the very end of the Reagan regime or, more likely, at the beginning 
of a new one, in which Barack Obama has turned out to be a reconstructive 
president after all. In this new political reality the Republican Party is 
gradually discovering that it is no longer the dominant party. 
Political dysfunction is heightened during such periods of regime 
transition. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the formerly 
dominant party cannot keep its coalition together, its coalition has been 
superseded by a new ascendant one associated with the opposition party, or 
both.  The second is that, although on the rise, the newly ascendant party (in 
this case, the Democrats) has not yet been able to establish its political 
hegemony, especially in the courts. 
If the formerly dominant party is in power during a time of regime 
transition, as the Democrats were during the Carter years, it is no longer able 
to work together effectively, leaving an opening for an oppositional party to 
engage in divide-and-conquer strategies. 
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On the other hand, if the previously dominant party no longer holds 
the presidency as a new regime is forming, the party may become 
increasingly radical and intransigent. That is what we are seeing today. The 
defenders of the old regime are doing almost anything they can think of to 
hold off and obstruct the incipient Obama regime.  
The Obama Administration’s response to this strategy has changed 
over time. At first, Obama acted like a preemptive president, trying to 
govern on a terrain largely dictated by his political opponents. He attempted 
various forms of bi-partisan compromise; he also tried, in the fashion of the 
last preemptive Democrat, Bill Clinton, to triangulate, and to take the best 
ideas of conservatives, rework them slightly, and claim them for himself.  
Obama may have been convinced that he had to make compromises in order 
to keep the economy afloat to ensure his reelection. This helps explains the 
April 2011 budget accord as well as the Budget Control Act that ended the 
2011 debt ceiling crisis. 
This strategy of  triangulation and conciliation had only limited 
success, and Obama was all but politically humiliated in the debt ceiling 
crisis of 2011.   But he was able to keep the economy expanding slowly, and 
he was reelected by a healthy margin, in large part because by 2012 the 
Republican Party was greatly weakened and its increasingly radical views 
had turned off enough members of the public.  
The Obama administration has gradually figured out that its best 
strategy is not Clintonian-style triangulation and compromise, but rather to 
lay out what it regards as reasonable policies, even if they are deemed quite 
liberal, and to provoke the most extreme elements of the Republican Party to 
act out, and further delegitimate the Reagan regime and the mainstream 
Republican Party.  Put another way, the Obama Administration has 
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gradually learned how to practice a left-wing form of wedge politics. Its 
success in doing so is further evidence that Obama is now behaving like a 
reconstructive president, and that we are transitioning from an older and 
exhausted political regime into a new one. 
Obama’s success as a reconstructive president is hardly guaranteed.  
His presidency so far has been largely scandal free, but scandal is a 
persistent problem for second-term presidents, especially oppositional 
leaders. The second term of the last Democrat in the Reagan regime, Bill 
Clinton, was overwhelmed by the Lewinsky scandal (and Clinton was 
eventually impeached). The last preemptive Republican president in the 
New Deal/Civil Rights regime, Richard Nixon, resigned in disgrace as a 
result of the Watergate scandal. 
Not surprisingly, the Republican Party is busily looking for a scandal 
to slow down or halt Obama, with the hope that this can prevent a new 
Democratic regime from taking root.  This strategy helps explain repeated 
attempts to discover a Watergate-style scandal in the attack on the U.S. 
diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya. 
Because we are in a period of transition, in which the old order is 
attempting to prevent the birth of a new one that will displace it, we are 
seeing, to use an expression of Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner, a series of 
constitutional showdowns. At this point, the old regime has only the House, 
the use of the filibuster and hold rules in the Senate, and a significant 
segment of the federal courts. Each of these elements has become 
increasingly radicalized; and Republicans in the House and Senate have 
become increasingly intransigent. 
Everything we have seen in the past four years, from the tea party 
uprising to the debt ceiling crisis of 2011, to attempts at voter suppression in 
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the 2012 election, to the pitched battle over Obamacare, and the current 
challenges to the Voting Rights Act and affirmative action, is an 
increasingly desperate attempt to hold off, or at least slow down, the birth of 
a new constitutional regime. Although I believe that the new regime is 
actually upon us, it may take many more years for things to be settled-- for 
example the Republicans still control the House and probably will for many 
years. Indeed, if historical trends continue, they will probably increase their 
membership in the House and Senate in the 2014 elections. This likely 
political victory will give them additional incentives to believe that they can 
stop a new regime from forming. As a result, we should expect more of the 
same for a while. 
The last dying days of the old regime, and the birth pangs of the new 
regime, have helped create a remarkably dysfunctional Congress. I do not 
claim that this is the only cause of our present dysfunction, merely a major 
factor.  Indeed, I am willing to go out on a limb and predict that when the 
new regime is more fully in place, people will stop complaining that the 
country is dysfunctional (With the exception of Sandy Levinson, who has 
other reasons for complaint).  During the late 1970s, many people believed 
that the national government was too big for any one person to run. By 1984, 
few people thought that any more. The reason was that the New Deal/Civil 
Rights regime had cratered, and a new regime was ascendant. This is, I 
submit, what is going on today. The difference between Reagan and 
Obama’s situation is that, in Obama’s case, it took much longer for the 
dominant regime to fall apart. Obama spent most of his first term acting like 
a preemptive president in the Clinton mold. Only after the debt ceiling crisis 
of 2011—the key turning point in his presidency—did his political posture 
change. In the past year he has begun to take on the mantle of a 
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reconstructive presidency.  He is now behaving like a reconstructive leader, 
although, ironically, his opportunities for genuine domestic reform are more 
limited than they were in the first two years of his presidency. 
What is the relationship between this transitional period and executive 
power?  When Congress becomes dysfunctional—unable or unwilling to act 
constructively—this empowers the executive. More correctly, it increases 
the executive's incentives to develop end-runs that allow it to act without 
fresh approval from Congress or cooperation with Congress. For example, 
the executive may develop provocative theories of executive power, or it 
may read previous Congressional grants of power liberally or expansively so 
that it can claim that Congress has already approved its actions. 
The Obama Adminstration’s reading of "hostilities" in the War 
Powers Resolution is an example of the latter strategy.  The 
Administration’s increasing use of drones as a substitute for the preventive 
detention system created by George W. Bush, and the systematic use of 
recess appointments are examples of the former strategy. When Congress 
attempted to prevent intra-session recess appointments, President Obama 
tried to work around those, leading to the Noel Canning dispute. 
Ultimately, a dysfunctional Congress, rather than blocking a president 
successfully, actually undermines its own authority and drives the executive 
to increasingly far-fetched interpretations of law that undermine structural 
values of separation of powers and checks and balances. 
In Noel Canning, a conservative judiciary allied with the old regime 
stepped in on the side of conservative Republicans in Congress.  The fact 
that the D.C. Circuit chose such radical reasoning is evidence of the kind of 
decisions that affiliated judicial actors make in the last stages of a political 
regime.  (The Obamacare debate is another example.) 
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Normally, the courts will avoid resolving these sorts of inter-branch 
conflicts, but there was precedent for treating this one as justiciable.  After 
all, the NLRB makes decisions that directly affect people’s economic 
interests. The courts are somewhat less likely to intervene on Congress's 
behalf in foreign policy issues like the construction of the War Powers Act 
(although the Supreme Court did intervene in Boumedienne when it saw that 
its own jurisdiction was threatened.) If Noel Canning had been a case about 
national security, even conservative judges might have looked at it 
differently. 
Noel Canning has a Bush v. Gore like quality about it. It seems to 
enforce “low” politics—the politics of partisan advantage—rather than 
“high” politics—the politics of constitutional principle.  It is difficult to 
believe that if President Bush's recess nominations to various executive 
departments had been challenged by liberals, this particular panel of the 
D.C. circuit would have taken the opportunity to outlaw intra-session 
appointments once and forever.  (Sandy points out, quite correctly, that John 
Bolton’s nomination to the U.N. Ambassadorship might have been upheld 
on the narrower grounds that no one had individual standing to object to it.) 
One important difference between Noel Canning and Bush v. Gore is 
that the Noel Canning opinion is designed to have precedential weight. It 
seems to say that from now on no president—Democrat or Republican—can 
make intrasession appointments if the vacancy did not occur and was not 
filled during “the” recess of the Senate.  This, I think, stems from the way 
that ideological commitments limit the ways that affiliated judges can 
operate.  And the textualist strategy that the two member majority employed 
gave them somewhat less room to argue in Noel Canning as the Supreme 
Court did in Bush v. Gore, that “Our consideration is limited to the present 
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circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes 
generally presents many complexities.” 
The litigation over the NLRB appointment in question appears to be a 
stalking horse for another highly ideologically charged controversy. The 
current controversy over President Obama’s recess appointments arises in 
the context of Senate Republicans' attempt to effectively shut down a new 
consumer protection agency created in the Dodd-Frank bill. They have 
attempted to make the agency a nullity by refusing to appoint anyone to head 
it. This led to the recess appointment of Richard Cordray (with Obama 
taking the very aggressive position that, because of the date on which he was 
nominated, Cordray may serve for two years instead of one.)  Republican 
opposition to appointing a head of the agency is not to the qualifications of 
any of President Obama's nominees, including Cordray. It is to the consumer 
protection bureau itself.  Even if Jesus Christ himself were nominated the 
GOP would vote against it. (They might also worry, of course about certain 
statements in the Gospels in which Jesus appears to be socialist and engaged 
in class warfare against the rich. But I digress.). 
For this reason, I regard Noel Canning as a rear guard action during a 
time of regime transition.  It features members of a conservative judiciary 
affiliated with the old regime coming to the aid of Senate Republicans.  
These Republicans are attempting to hold off the operation of an agency 
associated with the new regime, and, more generally, are attempting to 
cripple the new regime by denying it the ability to staff a wide range of 
executive and judicial positions.  It will be very interesting to see what 






 I think this is a terrific example of the difference between old-
fashioned “internalist” analysis and the insights provided by a more 
“externalist” focus.  This difference in perspectives is clearly with us quite 
literally from the very beginning:  Do we take Marbury seriously as legal 
analysis in its own terms, with its strained, if not dishonest, interpretations of 
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act and then Article III of the Constitution, or do 
we necessarily have to understand it within the context of the great political 
shootout (“showdown/hardball”) generated by the Election of 1800?  I do 
not disagree with a word of Jack’s analysis, but I don’t know that he truly 
answers the question of how we as lawyers (assuming that notion itself 
makes any real sense in the now century-long Realist and post-Realist age) 
assess the arguments proffered in Noel Canning. 
 After all, even with Bush v. Gore, the epitome for many of us of a 
low, dishonest, politically-driven decision, much of the criticism focuses on 
what might be termed “insincerity”:  I.e,, as Richard Posner, the most 
persuasive defender of the Supreme Court’s intervention, readily conceded, 
it is inconceivable that at least three of the justices in the majority believed 
the arguments of the per curiam that they signed, inasmuch as they 
depended entirely on giving full weight to Warren-Court precedents that 
they despised and had attacked in other cases.  Noel Canning, of course, 
basically cites no cases at all, and instead adopts a textualist/originalist 
approach that one must presume the DC Circuit Court conservatives 
genuinely believe (whatever that precisely means).   
 And a problem with the “political question” argument, which surely 
would have applied to John Bolton, say, who was merely the ambassador 
and could make no decisions legally enforceable against others, is that it has 
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little purchase with regard to an agency like the NLRB, which does issue 
enforceable orders.  Noel Canning is entitled, under any plausible notion of 
“rule of law,” to a determination whether the decision-maker attempting to 
coerce the company is legitimate, and the Court, of course, said it was not 
for failure to achieve the required quorum.  How could the Court have 
refused to decide the issue?  The objection to Noel Canning has to be on the 
merits, I think, not on the Court’s taking the case in the first place.   
 In any event, there is much to look forward to with regard to the twists 
and turns of the Supreme Court justices when they hear Noel Canning on 
appeal.  Will textualism triumph over support for a strong executive on the 
part of Antonin Scalia, for example.  Or will everything turn on a formalist 
reading of what counts as even an “intra-session recess”?  In answering that 
question, incidentally, should it matter that the phenomenon of the “not-
open-for-business-but-still-in-session” of the Senate was begun by 
Democrats eager to limit the power of a Republican President and not 
(unlike, say, the “Hastert Rule” that turns the Speaker of the House into a 
Party apparatchnik instead of a truly “public” official) invented by 
Republicans who recognize, a la Jack’s analysis, that their days are 
numbered? 
